



centre for democratic institutions

# **Consolidation and Change: The Indonesian Parliament after the 2004 Elections**

**A Report on Political Parties**

**Dr Stephen Sherlock**

**June 2004**

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## About the Author

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## About the Centre for Democratic Institutions

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- with two cross-cutting themes:
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# Consolidation and Change: The Indonesian Parliament after the 2004 Elections

The second democratic parliamentary elections in Indonesia since the fall of the Suharto regime took place on 4 April 2004. The elections for the national legislature, the People's Representative Assembly or *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* (DPR), represented an important step towards the successful consolidation of democratic processes in Indonesia, taking place without serious violence or evidence of electoral fraud and intimidation. The results were generally accepted as valid and legitimate, both within the electorate and amongst the parties and candidates.

Parliamentary terms in Indonesia are fixed for a five year period and coincide with the five-year cycle of Presidential terms.<sup>1</sup> This paper analyses the composition of the new DPR, examining the trends in party representation between the previous DPR of 1999-2004 and the new parliament elected for the period 2004-2009. The paper also examines trends in regional representation and in the representation of women between the two parliaments.<sup>2</sup>

## 73 Per cent are new Members

The most obvious feature of the new DPR is the very large influx of new Members. Of the 550 Members, 400 (73%) will be entering the parliament for the first time. This is partly because the DPR was increased in size from 500 to 550 (a 19% increase) and because 38 seats previously allotted to unelected representatives from the Armed Forces and Police (TNI/POLRI) were replaced with elected Members, thus creating new 88 seats to be taken up by elected Members. But in addition to the effects of this institutional change, the 2004-2009 Assembly will be very different from the previous DPR because there was a very high turnover of Members. Of the 462 elected Members of the old DPR, only 150, or 32%, were re-elected.

## New Members by party

The influx of new Members was not uniform across the parties in the Assembly. The party which succeeded in having the largest number of its Members reelected was Golkar, retaining 62 of the 120 representatives from the old DPR, or 48 per cent. Since Golkar picked up 8 new seats in 2004, 66 of its 128 Members (52 per cent) will be first-timers. Megawati's PDIP, on the other hand, fared quite badly in terms of reelection, with

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<sup>1</sup> For an extended analysis of the functioning of the DPR see Stephen Sherlock, *Struggling to Change: The Indonesian Parliament in an Era of Reformasi*, Centre for Democratic Institutions, Canberra, 2003. [www.cdi.anu.edu.au](http://www.cdi.anu.edu.au)

<sup>2</sup> Special acknowledgement is due to the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), the Centre for Electoral Reform (CETRO) and Awasiparlemen for sources of data for this study. The author is particularly grateful for data on women's representation provided by Toni Sanders Whyte.

just 47 of its 153 Members (31 per cent) returning as Members of the new DPR. This was largely because of its spectacular loss of electoral support, falling from 34% to 18.5% of the popular vote and from 153 to 109 DPR seats (33% to 19.9%). The major party with the largest turnover was the party of former President Aburrahman Wahid (PKB), which retained just 8 of its 51 Members (16 per cent) from the old DPR. PKB's vote declined from 12.6% to 10.6% and its representation in the Assembly went from 52 to 51 Members (11.3% to 9.5%).

The other major influx of new Members came from the sudden appearance on the electoral scene of the Democrat Party, created by the former Security Minister and Presidential candidate, Susilo Bambang Yudhyono. The Democrat Party won 58 seats (10.4%), a figure which over-represents the 7.5% of the popular vote it received. A further important development was the great rise in popular support for the Justice and Welfare Party (PKS) (previously known as the Justice Party (PK)), which increased from 1.8% of the vote in 1999 to 7.4% in 2004, increasing its DPR seats from 7 to 45 seats (1.1% to 8.2%). There was also a significant increase in Members from the National Mandate Party (PAN), whose slight loss of electoral support (7.1% to 6.4%) did not prevent it from increasing its DPR representation from 34 to 52 (7.4% to 9.5%).

#### DPR: Party representation, 1999-2004 & 2004-09

<i>Party</i>	<i>% of Votes</i>		<i>No. of Members (462 elected)</i>		<i>% of Members</i>	
	<i>1999-2004</i>	<i>2004-2009</i>	<i>1999-2004</i>	<i>2004-2009</i>	<i>1999-2004</i>	<i>2004-2009</i>
<b>Golkar</b>	22.4	21.6	120	128	26.0	23.3
<b>PDIP Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle</b>	33.7	18.5	153	109	33.1	19.8
<b>PPP United Development Party</b>	10.7	8.2	58	58	12.6	10.6
<b>PD Democrat Party</b>	n/a	7.5	n/a	57	n/a	10.4
<b>PKB National Awakening Party</b>	12.6	10.6	51	52	11.0	9.5
<b>PAN National Mandate Party</b>	7.3	6.4	34	52	7.4	9.5
<b>PKS</b>	1.3	7.3	7 (as PK)	45	1.5	8.2

<b>Justice &amp; Welfare Party</b>						
<b>PBR Star Reform Party</b>	n/a	2.4	n/a	13	n/a	2.4
<b>PDS Peace &amp; Welfare Party</b>	n/a	2.1	n/a	13	n/a	2.2
<b>PBB Crescent &amp; Star Party</b>	1.8	2.6	13	11	2.8	2.0
<b>PPDK Democracy Unity &amp; Nationhood Party</b>	n/a	1.2	n/a	4	n/a	0.9
<b>PKPB Care for the Nation Functional Party</b>	n/a	2.1	n/a	2	n/a	0.4
<b>PP Pioneer Party</b>	n/a	0.8	n/a	3	n/a	0.5
<b>PKPI Indonesian Justice &amp; Unity Party</b>		1.25	4 (as PKP)	1	0.8	0.2
<b>PNIM Indonesian Nationalist Party – Marhaenism</b>		0.8	n/a	1	n/a	0.2
<b>PPDI Indonesian Democracy Upholders Party</b>		0.8	2 (as PDI)	1	0.4	0.2

## A more fragmented parliament

The DPR of 2004-2009 is a much more politically diffuse and fragmented parliament than its predecessor and the formation of a majority will be much more problematic. The old DPR was numerically dominated by PDIP, with one-third of Members. The second largest party, Golkar, held about a quarter of the seats and these two largest parties together formed a clear majority of the elected seats (59%) and a comfortable majority of all seats (55%). PDIP held almost as many seats as all the other non-Golkar parties put

together. Three middle-sized parties (PPP, PKB and PAN) together made up almost one third of the DPR and the rest was held by 15 small parties, 10 of which held just one seat each.

In the 2004 election, voters returned a DPR with a wide spread of representation. The large number of voters who deserted the PDIP in April 2004 did not move uniformly behind one other major party but appear to have scattered their vote. In particular, Golkar failed to pick up the PDIP vote and despite emerging as the largest single party in the DPR, its relative strength decreased from 26% of elected seats in 1999-2004 to 23% of seats in 2004-2009. PDIP now holds less than 20% of seats in the new DPR. Thus the two major parties are together well short of a majority. Almost half of the seats are now held by five middle sized parties with about 8-10% each: PPP, Democrat Party, PKB, PKS and PAN. The relative distance between the strengths of the middle-sized parties and large parties is now much smaller than in the old DPR.

The only change that has reduced the size of the political spectrum has been the elimination of a number of very small parties. There are now only 3 parties with 1 seat each and 6 parties with from 2 to 13 seats each, making a total of 16 parties in the new DPR, compared with 21 parties in the old Assembly. This change was mainly brought about by reforms to the electoral system that made it more difficult for very small parties to win a seat. Thus the 2004-2009 DPR has fewer parties, but the seats are more evenly distributed across the large and medium-sized parties. Whereas the old DPR was said to be dominated by the “big five” parties (of which PDIP was by far the largest), the new DPR is controlled by a “big seven” parties: the two large parties of roughly equal size and five others of roughly equal size.

The long-standing division in Indonesian politics between secular and Islamic parties has been reflected very closely in the two Assemblies, with only small movements between 1999 and 2004. In the 1999 election, secular and Christian parties received about 65% of the vote, but were somewhat under-represented in the DPR, receiving about 63% of the seats in the 1999-2004 DPR. In the 2004 election, there was a small swing away from the secular and Christian parties, leaving them with about 62% of the vote. This loss was mainly accounted for by the increase in votes for PKS, an Islamic party which campaigned effectively on an anti-corruption platform. The electoral system favoured the Islamic parties in 1999 (mainly because of their strength in off-Java provinces which received proportionately extra seats) and this effect was even more pronounced in 2004. The result was that the Islamic parties received about 38% of the vote, but were allocated about 42% of the DPR seats, while the secular parties’ 62% of votes won them only 58% of seats.

## **Regional loyalties still strong**

The strongly regional character of many of the parties in the 1999-2004 DPR is also a feature of the new parliament elected in 2004. While all of the major parties have some

spread of support across the country and none are entirely regionally-based, clear regional trends from the old DPR have been replicated in the new Assembly.

Indonesia can be seen as composed of three broad regions: the island of Sumatra, Java/Bali and eastern Indonesia. Java/Bali comprises about 60% of Indonesia's 215 million people and Sumatra and eastern Indonesia have about 20% each.<sup>3</sup> The island of Sumatra was the first region to come under Islamic influence from the thirteenth century and (especially in the western part) retains a stronger Islamic identity of the more scripturally purist modernist kind and a tendency to support Islamic modernist parties. Java/Bali is the demographic and political heartland of Indonesia, contains the most economically developed regions and is the home of the capital, Jakarta. In cultural terms, Java/Bali has been the centre of Hindu/Buddhist influences and of syncretic Islam which mixes Hindu/Buddhist and traditional Javanese beliefs and practices. The region is the stronghold of secular parties which have had their greatest appeal amongst syncretic Muslims and religious minorities. Java is also the focus of traditionalist Islamic parties.

The geographically scattered and culturally diverse eastern Indonesia region was the last to come under Islamic influence and (especially in the more Melanesian areas, including Papua) was the least influenced by historic Hindu/Buddhist culture. The region does have areas that are strongly Islamic, such as South Sulawesi, but it also contains the largest concentration of Christians and localised ethnic groups with deeply held cultural identities. This diversity is reflected in support for the full range of secular, Christian and Islamic parties, although Islamic modernist parties have generally been weaker in the region.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Roughly from west to east, Sumatra comprises Aceh, North Sumatra, West Sumatra, Riau, Riau Islands, Jambi, South Sumatra, Bangka Belitung, Bengkulu, and Lampung. Java/Bali comprises Banten, Special Region of Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, Special Region of Yogyakarta East Java and Bali. Eastern Indonesia comprises West Nusa Tenggara, East Nusa Tenggara, West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, North Sulawesi, Gorontalo, Central Sulawesi, South Sulawesi, Southeast Sulawesi, Maluku, North Maluku and Papua (which is the process of a controversial division into 3 provinces: for electoral purposes the half-island is divided into the 2 provinces of Papua and West Irian Jaya).

<sup>4</sup> Stephen Sherlock, *The 2004 Indonesian Elections: How the System Works and What the Parties Stand For*, Centre for Democratic Institutions, Canberra, 2004. [www.cdi.edu.au](http://www.cdi.edu.au)

Regional Composition of 1999-2004 DPR (Members per region by party)  
(excludes minor parties)

	Golkar	PDIP	PPP	PKB	PD	PAN	PKS (PK)	PBR	PDS	PBB
Sumatra	24	32	17	5	-	12	2	-	-	0
Java/Bali	41	92	28	43	-	17	5	-	-	6
Eastern Indonesia	53	27	13	3	-	5	0	-	-	3

Regional Composition of 2004-2009 DPR (Members per region by party)  
(excludes minor parties)

	Golkar	PDIP	PPP	PKB	PD	PAN	PKS	PBR	PDS	PBB
Sumatra	28	16	13	3	12	15	11	8	3	1
Java/Bali	59	76	33	47	35	28	27	1	3	2
Eastern Indonesia	41	17	12	2	10	9	7	4	7	2

In the previous DPR, Golkar's special focus of support in eastern Indonesia meant that 53 of its 120 Members (44%) represented that region, even though the east only has around one-fifth of the country's population. Less than half that number of Golkar Members (24) held seats in the similarly sized island of Sumatra, with the remainder (41) coming from Java. Golkar Members still have a strongly eastern element, but the party has lost some strength in eastern Indonesia in the new DPR and only one-third of its Members (41 of 128) now represent that region. Its representation from Sumatra is virtually the same as in the old DPR, with the party making up its eastern losses by increasing its strength in Java (from 32% to 46%).

PDIP was the party with the greatest claim to be a truly national party in the old DPR. The party's Members roughly reflected the relative size of the three regions, although its voter support was actually stronger in Java/Bali. In the new DPR, however, PDIP has become much more a party of its heartland in Java/Bali, with 70% of its Members now coming from that region compared with 60% in the old DPR. The remaining 30% are equally divided between Sumatra and eastern Indonesia.

The regional patterns of representation amongst the Islamic parties in the DPR have maintained an unmistakable continuity between the two Assemblies, although there has been some reshuffling within the Islamic constituency. Following both elections, the Islamic parties with an strongly modernist constituency (PPP, PAN, PKS, PBB and PBR)

have been relatively over-represented in Sumatra, with almost one third of their Members coming from a region with 21% of total DPR seats (in 2004-2009). Java/Bali and eastern Indonesia, with 57% and 22% of total DPR seats respectively, have 50% and 19% of their representatives from these Islamic parties. The concentration of the Islamic traditionalist constituency in Java has been reflected in the fact that the vast majority of PKB Members come from Java, especially East and Central Java. In the previous DPR, 43 of PKB's 51 Members (84%) were from Java and in the current DPR the party has lost even more non-Java Members, with 47 of 52 Members (90%) now representing Java. There has been some internal rearrangement of Islamic representation between the old and new DPRs, especially PPP's loss of a number of seats in Sumatra to its splinter party, PBR, as well as to PKS.

A notable feature of the new DPR is that both the Democrat Party and PKS, the two parties with newest profiles in the parliament have a quite even regional spread, with solid representation in each of the three regions. Their seats in each region are roughly proportionate to the total seats for that region in the DPR, although both parties are slightly weaker in the eastern region and stronger in Java. Both parties' strength in Java is a product of their particularly strong showing in the capital, Jakarta. PD and PKS each holds 5 of the 17 seats in the Special Capital Region, or 29%, a figure which contrasts with their 10% and 8% of total national seats respectively.

## **Women in the DPR**

The number of women in the DPR has risen slightly from the 1999-2004 Assembly to the 2004-2009 Assembly. There were 43 women elected in the 1999 election, compared to 61 in 2004, an increase from 9.3% of elected Members in 1999-2004 to 11.1% of Members in 2004-2009. Of the 43 elected in 1999, 12 were re-elected in 2004, a re-election rate of 18.5%. This compares to a re-election rate of 25.2% for male Members. Of the 400 new Members in the DPR of 2004-2009, 351 are men and 49 are women. A female Member is thus more likely to be a new Member than is a male Member.

The party distribution of women Members has shown some changes between the two parliaments, but the main patterns of representation have remained the same. Of the major parties, Golkar has had the largest percentage of female Members over both periods (13.3% and 14.0%), with PDIP in second place with 9.8% and 11.0% respectively. Thus although PDIP lost a large number of seats during the 2004 election, its women candidates had a very slightly better record of winning seats than their male counterparts.

One notable feature is the increase in women Members from Islamic parties. In the old DPR there were 11 Members from such parties, while the new DPR will have 22, an increase from 2.4% to 4.0% of total DPR Members.

## Women in the DPR: 1999-2004

<i>Party</i>	<i>No of Women DPR Members</i>	<i>% of Party's DPR Members</i>	<i>% of DPR (total=462)</i>
<b>Golkar</b>	16	13.3	3.5
<b>PDIP Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle</b>	15	9.8	3.2
<b>PPP United Development Party</b>	4	6.9	0.9
<b>PKB National Awakening Party</b>	4	7.8	0.9
<b>PAN National Mandate Party</b>	1	2.9	0.2
<b>PBB Crescent &amp; Star Party</b>	1	7.7	0.2
<b>PK (now PKS) Justice Party</b>	1	14.3	0.2
<b>PDKB Democratic Love the Nation Party</b>	1	20.0	0.2
<b>Others (13)</b>	0	0	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>n/a</b>	<b>9.3</b>

Women in the DPR: 2004-2009 (employing best information available)

<i>Party</i>	<i>No. of Women DPR Members</i>	<i>% of Party's DPR Members</i>	<i>% of DPR Members (total=550)</i>	<i>No. re-elected from 1999-2004 DPR</i>	<i>No. of New Women DPR Members</i>
<b>Golkar</b>	18	14.0	3.3	6	12
<b>PDIP</b> Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle	12	11.0	2.2	4	9
<b>PKB</b> National Awakening Party	7	13.5	1.3	1	6
<b>PD</b> Democrat Party	6	11.0	1.0	n/a	7
<b>PAN</b> National Mandate Party	7	13.5	1.3	0	7
<b>PKS (ex-PK)</b> Justice&Welfare Party	3	6.7	0.5	1	3
<b>PPP</b> United Development Party	3	5.2	0.5	0	3
<b>PDS</b> Peace & Welfare Party	3	25.0	0.5	n/a	3
<b>PBR</b> Reform Star Party	2	15.4	0.4	n/a	2
<b>PPDK</b> Democracy Unity & Nationhood Party	0	0	0	n/a	1
<b>PBB</b> Crescent Star Party	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Others (6)</b>	0	0	0	n/a	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>n/a</b>	<b>11.1</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>53</b>

## **The establishment of the new DPR**

Although elections for the DPR were held in April 2004 and the results were announced in May, the new DPR will not assemble until October 2004. This is because, as mentioned above, the five-year cycle of parliaments is linked directly to the cycle of office of the President of Indonesia. In 2004, for the first time in Indonesia's history, the President is to be directly elected by the people. The first round presidential vote takes place on 5 July and if no candidate receives more than 50% of the vote and 20% of the vote in at least half of provinces there will be a second round election between the first and second placed candidates on 20 September 2004. Following the presidential election, the MPR (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* or People's Consultative Council) will convene around 20 October 2004 to swear in the new President. At that time the new DPR will also be convened so that the terms of the President and the DPR cover the same five-year period.

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June 2004